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I. Introduction 
The Supreme Court did not acknowledge the impending 
fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright1 when it cited the 
case last Term in Martinez v. Ryan.2 But the Court did speak 
glowingly of the right enshrined by the landmark case. The right 
to the effective assistance of counsel at trial “is a bedrock 
principle in our justice system,” the Court explained;3 indeed, the 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Clinical Professor of Law, U.C. Berkeley School of Law. I am grateful 
for thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts from the editors of the Washington and 
Lee Law Review, Eric Freedman, Paula Harms, Chris Lasch, Andrea Roth, 
Bidish Sarma, Elisabeth Semel, Giovanna Shay, Tamar Todd, Amanda Tyler, 
and Chuck Weisselberg. Many thanks to Rebecca Popuch for outstanding 
research assistance. I am indebted to J.D. King for his insightful comments on 
this footnote. 
 1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 2. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 3. Id. at 1312. 
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Court continued, “the right to counsel is the foundation for our 
adversary system.”4 
What to do, then, when a defendant is afforded an attorney 
at trial but the attorney is not effective?5 Specifically, what is the 
appropriate mechanism for vindicating the right to effective 
counsel, especially for the vast majority of criminal defendants 
convicted of noncapital crimes, whose ability to secure 
postconviction counsel is effectively nil? In other words, how does 
a criminal defendant remedy the deprivation of a right that he 
cannot raise procedurally until he is no longer constitutionally 
entitled to an attorney? The Court did not use Martinez as a 
vehicle to resolve this critical issue, but its surprising ruling in 
the case, coupled with its ruling during the same Term in Maples 
v. Thomas,6 provides some indication of where this complicated 
area of law may be headed. 
Martinez was a sleeper case that did not register so much as 
a blip in the popular press at the time it was decided.7 Even in 
the legal media and academic circles, the decision did not initially 
stand out.8 Justice Kennedy, who wrote the opinion for the Court, 
                                                                                                     
 4. Id. at 1317. 
 5. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (noting that appointed 
counsel must provide “effective and substantial aid”). 
 6. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012). 
 7. A Lexis-Nexis search for news articles referencing Martinez written in 
the month following the decision produced only one article in the mainstream 
press. The article, printed in the Houston Chronicle, mentions Martinez in 
conjunction with the case of Texas death row inmate Robert Gene Will II, who 
has thus far been denied the opportunity to pursue federal habeas corpus relief 
despite significant evidence suggesting his actual innocence. Mike Tolson, Death 
Row—Bid to Spare Life Gains Traction, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 2, 2012, at A1, 
available at http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Death-row-
inmate-s-effort-to-spare-live-gains-3450225.php. 
 8. A search of legal journals and blogs in the immediate wake of the 
Martinez ruling produced very few discussions of the opinion. See Douglas A. 
Berman, Via Narrow 7–2 Ruling for Defendant, SCOTUS Dodges Sixth 
Amendment Issue in Martinez v. Ryan, SENTENCING L. AND POL’Y (Mar. 20, 2012, 
10:30 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2012/03/via-
narrow-7-2-ruling-for-defendant-scotus-dodges-sixth-amendment-issue-in-martinez-
v-ryan.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (noting that, in narrowly tailoring its 
decision, the Court in Martinez avoids addressing larger issues regarding a 
prisoner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Nancy King, Court Surprises in Martinez v. Ryan, 
HABEASBOOK.COM, (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.habeasbook.com/2012/03/court-
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could hardly have presented the issue in the case more 
dispassionately: “[W]hether a federal habeas court may excuse a 
procedural default of an ineffective assistance [of counsel] claim 
when the claim was not properly presented in state court due to 
an attorney’s error in an initial-review collateral proceeding.”9 
The matter-of-fact recitation of the procedural complexities, 
however, undersold what is perhaps one of the most enduringly 
challenging aspects of applying Gideon: how to actualize Gideon’s 
guarantee when most criminal defendants are stymied in their 
efforts to claim that their trial lawyers were ineffective. 
Despite the initially muted reaction to the Martinez decision, 
there are at least two indications of its importance. First, the 
opinion has now spawned voluminous commentary10 and 
                                                                                                     
drops-a-bombshell-in-martinez/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (asserting that the 
Martinez Court introduced an unusual standard—that federal review of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is warranted only when the claim is 
“substantial” and “has some merit”—without laying out how a prisoner could 
satisfy the standard) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Steve 
Vladeck, Opinion Analysis: A New Remedy, But No Right, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 
21, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/opinion-analysis-a-new-
remedy-but-no-right/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (noting that, in Martinez, the 
Court did not directly address whether prisoners are constitutionally entitled to 
effective assistance of postconviction counsel) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). Prior to the rulings in Martinez and Maples, Lee Kovarsky 
published a blog post suggesting the Court may use the cases to “deliver a 
watershed in criminal procedure” but one that would remain “largely unnoticed 
outside an enclave of highly-specialized habeas lawyers.” Lee Kovarsky, Maples 
and Martinez: Gideon for State Post-Conviction Review, PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 2, 
2011, 1:16 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/10/maples-v-
thomas-and-martinez-v-ryan-gideon-in-the-state-post-conviction-era.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
Court did not, as Kovarsky thought it might, choose to “constitutionalize a slice 
of state post-conviction review,” but he was prescient to highlight the 
importance of the cases. Id. He also noted that the potential importance of 
Martinez was not lost on government lawyers; twenty-four states and the 
federal government signed briefs urging the Court in Martinez not to create a 
constitutional right to postconviction counsel. Id. 
 9. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2012). 
 10. E.g., Eric Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State 
Post-Conviction Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines]; 
Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013); Nancy King, Preview: A Preliminary Survey of Issues Raised by Martinez 
v. Ryan, in LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. Supp. 
2012–2013) (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2147164; Lawrence 
Kornreich & Alexander I. Platt, The Temptation of Martinez v. Ryan: Legal 
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extensive litigation.11 Indeed, the Supreme Court will soon decide 
its first post-Martinez case.12 Second, the sarcasm and bitterness 
that pervades Justice Scalia’s dissent appears to reflect the 
significance that at least he attached to the lasting effect, or 
potential for future expansion, of the majority opinion. Here, the 
dissent’s opening words are the giveaway: “Let me get this 
straight.”13  
To back up and provide some context, Gideon held that the 
Sixth Amendment requires states to provide counsel to indigent 
criminal defendants at trial.14 The complete failure to provide 
counsel is an issue that can be raised on direct appeal in an 
individual case (as Clarence Earl Gideon did), or perhaps through 
a federal civil rights lawsuit.15 With respect to classes of 
                                                                                                     
Ethics for the Habeas Bar, 8 CRIM. L. BRIEF (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139506; Emily Garcia 
Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA 
Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal 
Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219, 1280 (2012); Eve Brensike Primus, 
Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of 
State Procedures, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Primus, Effective 
Trial Counsel], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2203391; David M. Barron, Martinez Casts Doubt on State Postconviction and 
Federal Habeas Representation, 27-FALL CRIM. JUST. 42, 42 (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 729 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that Martinez does not apply to the petitioner’s ineffectiveness of trial counsel 
claim “because Arkansas does not bar a defendant from raising claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal”); Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 
F.3d 222, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that state habeas counsel’s failure to 
raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in collateral proceedings is not 
cause to excuse procedural default and that Martinez applies only to 
ineffectiveness claims); Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133, 1148 (10th Cir. 
2012) (holding that, because Oklahoma law permitted the petitioner to assert 
his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, the failure of 
petitioner’s postconviction counsel to present his claim is not cause for the 
default); Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 609–10 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
Martinez does not apply to a petitioner who represented himself at trial). A 
review on Lexis-Nexis for cases citing Martinez in the ten months following the 
ruling reveals 494 cases.  
 12. See Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 524 (Oct. 29, 2012) (No. 11-10189). For discussion of Trevino, see infra 
note 33. 
 13. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
 15. In Colorado, for example, advocates recently filed a federal lawsuit 
RIGHT TO LITIGATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 843 
defendants to whom the courts have not yet applied Gideon, 
legislative and other policy advocacy can be fruitful.16 When trial 
counsel has been appointed, however, it is only through a 
posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that an 
individual defendant can seek a new trial based on the failure of 
the state to provide constitutionally adequate counsel.17  
Most ineffectiveness claims depend on discovery and 
investigation of facts that are outside of the trial record.18 For 
                                                                                                     
challenging the constitutionality of a state law that “statutorily requires 
indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases to consult with prosecutors about 
plea deals before they can receive their constitutional right to counsel.” David 
Carroll, Gideon Alert: Lawsuit Challenges Colorado Law Refusing Appointment 
of Counsel Until After Clients Meet with DA, NLADA (Dec. 12, 2012, 12:31 PM), 
http://www.nlada.net/jseri/gideon-blog/co_complaintfiledinmisdrsuit12-12-2010_ 
gideonalert (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. See AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 11–76 
(2010) (identifying failures in state indigent defense systems nationwide); J.D. 
King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the Adjudication of 
Misdemeanors, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 33–36 (Erik 
Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2011) (positing that there is an egregious lack of 
competent criminal defense available for indigent misdemeanor criminal 
defendants because both prosecutors and public defenders focus their attention 
on more serious crimes); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining 
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 
371–72 (2011) (arguing for the development of standards governing the 
representation of misdemeanor criminal defendants and for structural reform in 
the misdemeanor criminal system). 
 17. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–98 (1984) (articulating 
the components of and justifications for the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim and the convicted defendant’s burden of proof). 
 18. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003) (explaining that 
most ineffective assistance of counsel claims require “additional factual 
development” beyond what is contained in the trial record); Clive A. Stafford 
Smith & Rémy Voisin Starns, Folly by Fiat: Pretending that Death Row Inmates 
Can Represent Themselves in State Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings, 45 LOY. 
L. REV. 55, 90 (1999) 
[A]n ineffectiveness claim is classically an issue that requires 
additional evidentiary development. While there are various claims of 
ineffectiveness that focus on the trial record, “[a]t the heart of 
effective representation is the independent duty to investigate and 
prepare.” If trial counsel did not prepare, then the post-conviction 
advocate must not only prove this (by contacting trial counsel and 
securing his admission), but must also demonstrate prejudice—i.e., 
show the difference that the proper investigation would have made to 
the outcome of the completed trial. Obviously, the only way this can 
be done is to perform the investigation himself.  
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this reason, such claims are typically brought, if at all, in 
postconviction collateral proceedings.19 As Lee Kovarsky put it, 
“The reasons why inmates must press trial-phase 
[ineffectiveness] claims collaterally are intuitive: a trial lawyer 
won’t litigate his/her own ineffectiveness on appeal, and even a 
substituted appellate lawyer is not equipped to litigate a trial-
phase [ineffectiveness] claim without a reconstructed record.”20 
The development of ineffectiveness claims almost always 
requires the aid of counsel.21 This is a problematic requirement 
                                                                                                     
(quoting Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 (11th Cir. 1982) (citations 
omitted)). 
 19. See Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, 
Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1103, 1126–29 (1999) (explaining why ineffective assistance of counsel claims, in 
most circumstances, may only be practically raised in postconviction proceedings); 
Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 689 (2007) (noting that 
defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel are typically given a very brief 
posttrial window in which to file a motion for relief from the judgment in the form of 
a new trial). It is possible in most jurisdictions to raise ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in a motion for new trial proceeding, but this theoretical possibility is 
not practical when trial counsel is representing the defendant during this type of 
proceeding, and when time limits for bringing such claims are prohibitively short. 
See Primus, Effective Trial Counsel, supra note 10, at 11 (noting that because an 
attorney cannot be expected to raise the issue of her own ineffectiveness on appeal, 
initial collateral proceedings represent the first practical opportunity defendants 
have to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim); Kornreich & Platt, 
supra note 10, at 14–15 (positing that it is never ethically sound for an attorney to 
bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against herself, given that it is not in 
the lawyer’s own interest and, accordingly, will interfere with her ethical obligation 
to zealously advocate for her client). 
 20. Kovarsky, supra note 8; see also Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of 
Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower 
Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal 
Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 45 (2009)  
Because appellate courts cannot find facts, claims that depend on 
evidence outside the record on appeal cannot be raised; state 
postconviction proceedings are usually initiated in a trial-level court 
because the claims cognizable in postconviction proceedings are those 
that require evidence outside the record, and findings of fact by the court 
considering such evidence. 
 21. See Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to Counsel, 37 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 597, 609 (2011) (noting that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a prison 
inmate without counsel to gather extra-record evidence sufficient to establish 
prejudice under the ineffective assistance of counsel standard); Smith 
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given that the claims can usually only be brought in collateral 
proceedings.22 Because states are only required to provide counsel 
through an initial direct appeal,23 most defendants, and virtually 
all noncapital defendants, have no lawyer to file postconviction 
petitions in either state or federal court.24  
As a practical matter, then, the current state of the law 
ensures that the vast majority of convicted noncapital defendants 
have no recourse to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 
and thus no mechanism for vindicating the requirement that the 
counsel Gideon provides be “effective.”25 It is different for most 
capital defendants, who typically are provided counsel for state 
and federal collateral proceedings.26 For capitally convicted 
defendants, although the lack of a right to counsel impacts their 
ability to challenge the effectiveness of postconviction counsel, it 
does not work to deprive them of counsel altogether. So long as 
noncapital defendants are not provided postconviction counsel, 
                                                                                                     
& Starns, supra note 18, at 88–100 (establishing the many ways in which 
indigent prisoners are ill-equipped to develop and raise claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel).  
 22. See Voigts, supra note 19, at 1127–28 (explaining why ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims may generally not be brought on direct appeal); 
Massaro, 538 U.S. at 508–09 (acknowledging that claims raising trial counsel’s 
ineffectiveness in federal cases should typically be brought in postconviction 
proceedings and will not be barred if raised in those proceedings for the first 
time, even if they theoretically could have been raised on direct appeal). 
 23. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“Our cases 
establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, 
and no further.”); see also Primus, supra note 21, at 605–07 (noting that, while 
defendants have a constitutional right to effective counsel on initial direct 
appeal, that right does not extend to further appeals). 
 24. Arizona is an exception. The state provides postconviction counsel to all 
indigent defendants convicted at trial. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.4(c). 
 25. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 18 n.3 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court consistently has adhered to Justice Sutherland’s observation in 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 71 (1932), that when assistance of counsel is 
required, that assistance must be ‘effective’ rather than ‘pro forma.’”).  
 26. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 918 (2012) (noting that Alabama 
is “[n]early alone among the States” in that it does not “guarantee 
representation to indigent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings”); 
see infra note 174 (citing statute providing for counsel in capital federal habeas 
proceedings). 
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however, most violations of the fundamental right to counsel at 
trial are likely to go unremedied.27  
Although framed in limited terms, Martinez and Maples 
have opened the door to challenging the existing framework, 
making it appropriate to debate whether the right to effective 
assistance of counsel at trial includes, as well, the right to raise 
at least a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Gideon’s fiftieth anniversary provides an appropriate moment to 
reconsider a famous right, as well as the remedy that proves 
elusive for all but a handful of convicted defendants. 
In this Article, I argue that, in Martinez and, to a lesser 
extent, Maples, the Court has taken a step closer to recognizing 
not necessarily a broad right to postconviction counsel but 
rather a narrower yet critical right to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel in at least one forum. This is a right 
already afforded, de facto, to most capital defendants but to very 
few noncapital defendants. Framed as such, I suggest that 
Martinez and Maples portend a legal landscape in which it is 
possible to obtain a remedy for a Sixth Amendment violation 
without extending the right to counsel to postconviction cases in 
their entirety. While far from ideal, such a regime may be 
somewhat more palatable to the current Court, thus rendering 
visible—and actionable—violations of Gideon’s promise that are 
not brought to light under the existing regime.  
In Part II, I trace efforts over the past several decades to 
establish a constitutional right to counsel in postconviction 
proceedings. These efforts have been unsuccessful, and the 
Court has rejected the entreaties.28 The Court has done so, however, 
in a way that never quite foreclosed reconsideration. Such 
                                                                                                     
 27. I am deliberately excluding here a discussion of pro se prisoners filing 
meritorious federal habeas petitions. While it is theoretically possible for 
uncounseled prisoners to file such petitions (perhaps with respect to truly 
record-based ineffectiveness claims), these cases are the rare exception. For 
reasons discussed more fully infra, the ability to raise an ineffectiveness claim 
pro se does not equate to a remedy in any meaningful way. See Primus, supra 
note 21, at 608 (“Collecting the extra-record evidence to show that your trial 
attorney was constitutionally ineffective is particularly difficult if you are in 
custody and do not have the assistance of a lawyer. How are you supposed to 
supplement the trial court record from inside a prison cell?” (citation omitted)). 
 28. See infra notes 72–92 and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to recognize a constitutional right to postconviction counsel). 
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reconsideration looked possible, if unlikely, when the Court 
agreed to hear Martinez. 
The Court decided Martinez just two months after it ruled 
in Maples. Maples had headline-grabbing facts—involving the 
colossal failure on the part of a major New York corporate law 
firm to represent competently its pro bono client on death row in 
Alabama—but was, at bottom, about when “cause” could be 
established to excuse the failures of state-provided, 
postconviction counsel to which a defendant is not 
constitutionally entitled.29 In Maples, the Court held that, when 
postconviction counsel abandons their client, the agency 
relationship has been severed and the client can establish cause 
to excuse a procedural default.30 
When the Court agreed to review Martinez, some 
commentators read the tea leaves to suggest a reconsideration of 
the precedent holding that there was no constitutional right to 
postconviction counsel.31 But it was not to be. The Court 
explicitly avoided reaching a constitutional question about the 
right to postconviction counsel, ruling instead in the exercise of 
its equitable discretion that, as in Maples, under certain 
circumstances, inadequate postconviction representation can 
provide cause for the excusal of a procedural bar on federal 
habeas review.32 Specifically, Martinez held that ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel, or the lack of such counsel 
altogether, can excuse the procedural default of an ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim in federal court, at least in those 
                                                                                                     
 29. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 927; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 72 
(1977) (establishing that the rule barring federal habeas review will be excused 
upon a showing of “cause” and “prejudice”). 
 30. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 
 31. See Hugh Mundy, Rid of Habeas Corpus? How Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel Has Endangered Access to the Writ of Habeas Corpus and What the 
Supreme Court Can Do in Maples and Martinez to Restore It, 45 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 185, 212–13 (2011) (urging the Court to expand the right to counsel to 
cover first postconviction proceedings to “increase the likelihood that important 
constitutional claims reach federal courts without falling by the procedural 
wayside”). But see Tom Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 425, 460 (2011) (expressing pessimism about the Court’s future 
ruling in Martinez given its previous efforts to curtail review for defaulted 
claims). 
 32. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–19 (2012). 
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states where the law requires the claim to be raised 
postconviction.33 And once the default is excused, the door is 
open to merits review of the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim. 
While Martinez may have disappointed those hoping the 
Court would establish a constitutional right to postconviction 
counsel, it did upend what commentators and litigators had 
assumed for years was settled law regarding the relevance of 
postconviction counsel’s competence.34 And when coupled with 
Maples, it opened up intriguing new possibilities for the future 
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in noncapital cases, 
when defendants are typically without postconviction counsel.35 
Most notably, the Court’s opinion in Martinez suggested that it 
is as important to allow defendants an opportunity to pursue 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims as it is to allow 
them to raise record-based trial errors typically brought by 
constitutionally required appellate counsel. In the Court’s 
words, “[a] prisoner’s inability to present a claim of trial error 
                                                                                                     
 33. Id. at 1320. As noted above, the Supreme Court is now considering its 
first post-Martinez case. In this case, Trevino, the issue is whether, to put it as 
bluntly as the Texas Attorney General did in urging the Supreme Court not to 
grant review, Martinez “appl[ies] in Texas.” See Respondent’s Brief in 
Opposition at 11–14, Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-
10189), 2012 WL 3555164. In its review of Trevino, the Court will consider 
whether the Fifth Circuit was correct when it held that, because ineffectiveness 
claims can technically be brought prior to postconviction in Texas, Martinez does 
not apply in that state. See Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222, 225–27 (5th Cir. 
2012) (refusing to apply Martinez in Texas). The Court’s ruling in Trevino 
should have wide implications for the future scope of Martinez because the 
majority of states do, at least in theory, allow for ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims to be brought prior to postconviction review, even though such a 
practice is neither encouraged nor facilitated through the provision of time and 
resources. Eve Primus, who has exhaustively catalogued the state laws in this 
regard, has concluded that “in most states,” the requirement that ineffectiveness 
claims be brought in postconviction is “de facto rather than de jure.” Primus, 
Effective Trial Counsel, supra note 10, at 6 n.33 (cataloguing state laws). 
Trevino should shed light on whether the Court, in Martinez, intended to limit 
its application to only the handful of states, such as Arizona, that require, de 
jure, that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims be raised postconviction. 
 34. King, supra note 8 (“Until today, it was no excuse that a prisoner had 
no attorney (or only an incompetent attorney) in state collateral proceedings to 
help him comply with state rules. After today’s decision, it is.”). 
 35. See infra notes 173–75 (discussing implications of Martinez and Maples 
for noncapital defendants). 
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is of particular concern when the claim is one of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”36 
In Part III, I discuss in some detail the Court’s decisions in 
both Martinez and Maples, and situate them within the 
ineffectiveness jurisprudence. In each case, an indigent 
prisoner found himself before the Supreme Court, arguing that 
his postconviction counsel (to which he was not constitutionally 
entitled) erred in a way that deprived the state and federal 
habeas courts of an opportunity to review his claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.37 The Court could have 
used these cases as vehicles to announce a new constitutional 
right to counsel. Or it could have used them to further solidify 
the rule of Coleman v. Thompson,38 which has long stood for 
the proposition that the failures of postconviction counsel 
cannot be the basis of relief when appointment of that counsel 
was not constitutionally required.39  
Instead, in a pair of 7–2 decisions with Justices Scalia and 
Thomas dissenting in each, the Court declined to disturb the rule 
of Coleman40 and reiterated the general rule that the failure of 
postconviction counsel does not excuse a procedural default in 
federal court41—but also, in each case, recognized an exception 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (emphasis added). 
 37. See id. 1314–15 (stating that Martinez believed his postconviction 
attorney was ineffective because she had failed to raise an ineffectiveness of 
trial counsel claim in his initial collateral proceeding); Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. 
Ct. 912, 916–17 (2012) (outlining Maples’s argument that he should be 
permitted to file his habeas petition after the filing deadline because he was 
abandoned without notice by his out-of-state attorneys). 
 38. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 39. See id. at 752–54 (“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in 
state post-conviction proceedings. . . . Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.”). 
 40. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012) (“The rule of 
Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances recognized here.”); 
Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922 (“[W]hen a petitioner’s postconviction attorney misses 
a filing deadline, the petitioner is bound by that oversight and cannot rely on it 
to establish cause. . . . We do not disturb that general rule.” (citing Coleman, 501 
U.S. at 753–54)). 
 41. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320 (stating that an error on the part of 
postconviction counsel generally does not excuse a procedural default); Maples, 
132 S. Ct. at 922 (stating that postconviction counsel’s failure to meet a filing 
deadline does not generally constitute cause for circumventing a procedural 
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that excused the procedural default.42 Justice Scalia’s dissents 
took the Court to task for reiterating settled law while 
excusing the default in each case anyway with little regard, he 
contended, for the precedent set for future cases.43 
In Part IV, I take issue with the prevailing view of 
commentators, which appears to be that Martinez erects a set 
of procedural rules all but mandating states to provide 
postconviction counsel, even in the absence of a constitutional 
requirement.44 I have a somewhat different take. I am 
skeptical that the equitable ruling in Martinez provides 
sufficient incentive for states to provide postconviction counsel, 
and the current Court does not seem poised to announce a 
blanket constitutional right to postconviction counsel any time 
soon. I think, rather, that the more lasting effect of the 
decision may be the impact on the ability of noncapital 
defendants to argue that counsel is required in order to litigate 
the ineffectiveness of their trial counsel.  
Martinez and Maples do not necessarily evidence the 
Court’s concern that all defendants enjoy postconviction 
counsel; instead, they reflect the Court’s unease with the 
inability of defendants to raise, at least once, in some forum, a 
claim that they were deprived of constitutionally effective trial 
counsel. If the Court continues to attempt to remedy this 
problem through equitable as opposed to constitutional rulings, 
it is unlikely to provide much in the way of meaningful relief to 
uncounseled, noncapital defendants. But the logic and 
underlying concern the Court expressed in both cases does 
                                                                                                     
bar). 
 42. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320 (stating that the rule announced is an 
exception to Coleman); Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012) (justifying 
the holding based on the “extraordinary circumstances” of the case). 
 43. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Despite the 
Court’s protestations to the contrary, the decision is a radical alteration of our 
habeas jurisprudence that will impose considerable economic costs on the States 
and further impair their ability to provide justice in a timely fashion.”); Maples, 
132 S. Ct. at 934 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the interest of fairness justifies our 
excusing Maples’ procedural default here, it does so whenever a defendant’s 
procedural default is caused by his attorney. That is simply not the law—and 
cannot be, if the states are to have an orderly system of criminal litigation 
conducted by counsel.”). 
 44. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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portend the eventual recognition of a constitutional right, not 
necessarily to postconviction counsel generally, but to counsel 
who can raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in at 
least one forum.45 
I argue that Martinez and Maples are, then, less about the 
right to counsel in postconviction proceedings and more about the 
right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.46 This is 
a subtle distinction, but one that represents the triumph of 
Justice Kennedy’s view—first expressed in his concurrence in 
Murray v. Giarratano,47 that postconviction is a critical stage in 
the criminal process in most states because it is the first real 
opportunity to present an ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claim—over Justice Rehnquist’s view of postconviction as an 
insignificant appendage to the appellate process. Martinez and 
Maples are decisions that have been (cautiously) celebrated by 
the capital defense bar but may actually have a more lasting 
effect on noncapital defendants because it is noncapital 
defendants who are typically unable to raise ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims at any time.  
While Martinez and Maples themselves admit only of narrow 
exceptions to the procedural default rule in federal court, they 
suggest a framing in future cases that focuses more on the right 
to bring an ineffectiveness claim derived directly from the Gideon 
                                                                                                     
 45. See infra Part IV.B. 
 46. Much has been written about the right to counsel (or lack thereof) in 
postconviction proceedings, but the question is almost never framed in terms of 
a right to litigate an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. One exception 
is Kirk J. Henderson, The Right to Argue that Trial Counsel Was 
Constitutionally Ineffective, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (2006). This Article is a detailed 
account of Pennsylvania law on the right to raise ineffectiveness claims, and it 
makes a number of policy proposals specifically related to defendants in 
Pennsylvania who receive short prison sentences. Id. at 32–45. In the course of 
making these proposals, Henderson argues that “the right to counsel is the 
keystone right enjoyed by a criminal defendant and . . . a defendant, thus, must 
be given an opportunity to vindicate the deprivation of that right.” Id. at 20. 
 47. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central part of the 
review process for prisoners sentenced to death.”); see also id. at 25 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“The postconviction procedure in Virginia may present the first 
opportunity for an attorney detached from past proceedings to examine the 
defense and to raise claims that were barred on direct review by prior counsel’s 
ineffective assistance.”). 
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right itself, as opposed to a right to secure postconviction counsel 
writ large.48 Votes apparently did not exist on the currently 
constituted Court for such an expansion of the right to counsel in 
Martinez. As a result, the immediate impact of Martinez and 
Maples, especially for noncapital defendants who are unlikely to 
secure federal habeas counsel, is minimal. But the logic of the 
cases is inescapable: for the bedrock principle of Gideon to 
provide meaningful protection to the indigent-accused, counsel 
must be afforded to allow for the presentation of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims. 
II. The Elusive Right to Postconviction Counsel 
This year also marks the fiftieth anniversary of Douglas v. 
California,49 which was decided the same day as Gideon. In 
Douglas, the Court held that states must provide counsel to 
indigent defendants for their “first appeal, granted as a matter of 
right.”50 The decision, written by Justice Douglas, appears to be 
grounded in both due process and equal protection principles, 
with an emphasis on the latter: “[W]here the merits of the one 
and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without 
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been 
drawn between rich and poor.”51 Douglas did not create a right to 
appeal, but it does stand for the proposition that when states 
choose to grant criminal defendants a right to appeal, they must 
provide counsel as well.52 
                                                                                                     
 48. See discussion infra Part IV.B (suggesting a right to pursue an 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim). 
 49. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
 50. Id. at 366. 
 51. Id. at 357; see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608–09 (1974) (noting that 
it is not clear whether Douglas was grounded in equal protection or due process 
principles); id. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Douglas v. California was 
grounded on concepts of fairness and equality.”). In Halbert v. Michigan, the 
Court observed that its cases on “appeal barriers encountered by persons unable 
to pay their own way” were grounded generally in both equal protection and due 
process concerns. 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005). 
 52. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (“A review by an 
appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the 
offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law, and is not 
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Douglas represented the high-water mark with respect to the 
Court’s extension of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. A 
series of cases, beginning with Ross v. Moffitt53 in 1974 and 
concluding with Coleman v. Thompson in 1991, held that the 
Constitution generally does not require states to provide counsel 
beyond the first appeal as of right.54 
Ross considered whether Douglas should be extended to 
discretionary state appeals and to applications for review in the 
Supreme Court.55 In an opinion written by then-Justice Rehnquist, 
the Court held that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal 
Protection Clause requires states to provide counsel beyond the 
first appeal as of right.56 With respect to due process, the Court 
emphasized the differences between the trial and appellate stages 
of a criminal proceeding. Regarding appeal, the Court noted: 
[I]t is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who 
initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts 
of the State’s prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt 
made by a judge or a jury below. The defendant needs an 
attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him against being 
“haled into court” by the State and stripped of his presumption 
of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior 
determination of guilt.57 
Because the right to an appeal is not constitutionally guaranteed, 
the Court held, there can be no violation of due process when the 
state refuses to provide counsel “at every stage” of the appellate 
                                                                                                     
now, a necessary element of due process of law.”); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 
492 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing McKane and describing 
the holding of Douglas); Ross, 417 U.S. at 606 (citing McKane and noting the 
“traditional principle that a State is not obliged to provide any appeal at all for 
criminal defendants”). 
 53. Ross, 417 U.S. at 600. 
 54. See id. at 612 (“[W]e do not believe that the Equal Protection Clause . . . 
requires North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent defendants seeking 
to take discretionary appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court, or to file 
petitions for certiorari in this Court.”); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 
(1991) (“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings.”). 
 55. Ross, 417 U.S. at 600. 
 56. Id. at 609–16. 
 57. Id. at 610. 
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process.58 The Court, implicitly recognizing that this reasoning 
could just as easily govern the question presented in Douglas, 
then moved on to analyze the claim under an equal protection 
analysis.59 
With respect to equal protection, the Court concluded that an 
uncounseled, indigent defendant seeking discretionary review in 
a state’s highest court, when he has received counsel for his first 
appeal as of right (to the state’s intermediate appellate court), is 
not so much worse off than a defendant with the resources to hire 
appellate counsel.60 After all, the Court noted, the indigent 
defendant might not have a lawyer, but he will have at his 
disposal “a transcript or other record of the trial proceedings, a 
brief on his behalf filed in the Court of Appeals setting forth his 
claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of 
Appeals disposing of his case.”61 This material, along with 
whatever the indigent defendant can come up with on his own, 
provides the state supreme court “with an adequate basis for its 
decision to grant or deny review.”62 
Justice Rehnquist had become Chief Justice by the time the 
Court decided Pennsylvania v. Finley63 in 1987, and he wrote the 
opinion for the Court in that case as well. At its most narrow 
reading, Finley, a noncapital case, was about whether the 
procedures dictated in Anders v. California64 had to be followed in 
state postconviction proceedings.65 To answer that question, 
                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 611. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. at 616  
This is not to say that a skilled lawyer . . . would not prove helpful 
to any litigant able to employ him. . . . But both the opportunity to 
have counsel prepare an initial brief in the Court of Appeals and the 
nature of discretionary review in the [state supreme court] make 
this relative handicap far less. 
 61. Id. at 615. 
 62. Id. The Court did not discuss the possibility that an indigent 
defendant’s need for counsel would be significantly greater if the state 
supreme court decided to grant review. 
 63. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). 
 64. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
 65. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 554 (“We think that the court below 
improperly . . . extend[ed] the Anders procedures to postconviction proceedings.”). 
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however, the Court felt obligated to first discuss whether indigent 
defendants had a constitutional right to counsel in state 
postconviction proceedings.66 If not, then the Anders procedures 
would not apply.67 The Court made quick work of the suggestion 
that there is a constitutional right to postconviction counsel, 
noting that because Ross foreclosed the possibility of a 
constitutional right to counsel for discretionary appeals, there 
could be no such right “when attacking a conviction that has long 
since become final upon exhaustion of the appellate process.”68 
Indeed, the Court held, “Postconviction relief is even further 
removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct 
review.”69 Thus, the Court concluded, while Pennsylvania had 
made the “valid choice” to provide postconviction counsel, it was 
not constitutionally required to have done so.70 And because it 
was not constitutionally required to provide counsel, it could not 
be required to follow the Anders procedures when it elected to 
provide counsel: “[T]he Constitution does not put the State to the 
difficult choice between affording no counsel whatsoever or 
following the strict procedural guidelines enunciated in Anders.”71 
Two years after Finley, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a 
four-Justice plurality in Murray v. Giarratano,72 a federal civil 
rights action alleging a constitutional right to postconviction 
counsel in capital cases. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Finley for 
the proposition that the Constitution does not require “the State 
to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state 
postconviction relief.”73 The question for the Court in Giarratano, 
however, was whether the fact that a case was capital dictated a 
different result.74 “No,” said the plurality, holding that “the rule 
                                                                                                     
Anders announced procedures for appointed appellate counsel to follow if 
counsel believes no colorable appellate claims exist. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 
 66. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 556–57. 
 70. Id. at 559. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 73. Id. at 7. 
 74. Id. at 4–6. 
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of Pennsylvania v. Finley should apply no differently in capital 
cases than in noncapital cases.”75 Noting again the belief that 
postconviction proceedings “serve a different and more limited 
purpose than either the trial or appeal,” the Rehnquist plurality 
was satisfied that the Eighth Amendment protections afforded to 
capital defendants at trial were sufficient to “assure the 
reliability of the process by which the death penalty is imposed.”76 
Justice Kennedy did not join the plurality opinion in 
Giarratano, but he provided the fifth vote against the petitioner 
class of Virginia death row inmates.77 And though his vote sealed 
the fate of the petitioners in Giarratano, his concurring opinion in 
the case struck a remarkably different tone with respect to the 
role of postconviction in our system. It did so in a way that 
foreshadowed Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in 
Martinez more than two decades later.  
Justice Kennedy began his concurring opinion, which Justice 
O’Connor joined, by stating, “It cannot be denied that collateral 
relief proceedings are a central part of the review process for 
prisoners sentenced to death.”78 He noted the substantial success 
rate of collateral attacks in capital cases,79 and also commented 
that, at least in death penalty cases, defendants required the 
assistance of counsel to meaningfully litigate in collateral 
proceedings: “The complexity of our jurisprudence in this area, 
moreover, makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be able 
to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the 
assistance of persons learned in the law.”80 Justice Kennedy was 
operating from a very different premise than that of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, who, as noted above, relegated the postconviction 
process to insignificant status in the context of the overall 
proceedings in a criminal case.81 
                                                                                                     
 75. Id. at 10. 
 76. Id.; see also id. at 13 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]here is nothing in 
the Constitution or the precedents of this Court that requires that a State 
provide counsel in postconviction proceedings.”). 
 77. Id. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 9 (“[D]irect appeal is the primary avenue for review of a 
conviction or sentence, and death penalty cases are no exception.” (quoting 
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Justice Kennedy concluded that, because the record revealed 
that “no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to 
obtain counsel to represent him in postconviction proceedings,” he 
was “not prepared” to say that Virginia’s postconviction scheme 
violated the Constitution.82 His concurrence was explicitly based 
“[o]n the facts and record of this case.”83 But his deciding fifth 
vote implies that he believed that the Constitution does provide 
some meaningful access to postconviction counsel, at least in 
capital cases.84 As Eric Freedman has argued, “Contrary to much 
loose talk, Giarratano did not decide that there is no right to 
counsel in state postconviction proceedings in capital cases.”85 
Rather, Freedman points out, “Giarratano only rejected the claim 
of constitutional entitlement in that particular instance.”86 
At issue two years after Giarratano, in Coleman v. 
Thompson, was counsel’s failure, on appeal from the trial court’s 
denial of the state postconviction petition, to file a timely notice of 
appeal.87 Coleman alleged that his postconviction counsel’s 
ineffective assistance—the failure of his pro bono law firm to file 
the notice of appeal on time—was sufficient “cause” for the 
procedural default in state court and he should be permitted to 
                                                                                                     
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983))). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel 
in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1086 
(2006) (arguing that “five, and perhaps six Justices [in Giarratano] plainly 
believed that states” had a constitutional obligation to provide postconviction 
counsel to death row inmates). 
 85. Id. at 1089; see also Smith & Starns, supra note 18, at 57–58 (“[I]n 
Murray v. Giarratano, four members of the Supreme Court opined that there 
was no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings, even in a capital case. The key to the case, however, was in the 
concurrences . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 86. Freedman, supra note 84, at 1089; see also Smith & Starns, supra note 
18, at 57–58 (noting that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Giarratano was 
limited only to the specific facts of the case). Freedman suggests that 
Giarratano “implicitly held that other facts would lead to other results.” 
Freedman, supra note 84, at 1089. At the very least, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence does not foreclose the possibility of a different result on different 
facts. 
 87. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (outlining Coleman’s 
claim that his attorney’s error should excuse the procedural default). 
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pursue federal habeas relief.88 Thus, the Court was called to 
determine whether Coleman, a death row inmate, had a right to 
counsel at that stage. If so, ineffective assistance could be 
grounds for “cause” to excuse the default; if not, it could not.89 
In Coleman, the Court announced that “[t]here is no 
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings.”90 Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court cited 
both Finley and Giarratano summarily for this proposition91 and 
concluded that, “[b]ecause Coleman had no right to counsel to 
pursue his appeal in state habeas, any attorney error that led to 
the default of Coleman’s claims in state court cannot constitute 
cause to excuse his default in federal habeas.”92 
The Court in Coleman explicitly left open the question 
whether there should be an “exception” to the rule of Finley and 
Giarratano “in those cases where state collateral review is the 
first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.”93 
The Court did not need to reach the question because Coleman 
did have one court review his state habeas claims—the state trial 
court.94 
In sum, before last Term, the Supreme Court had never 
assigned any relevance to the quality of postconviction counsel, 
even in capital cases.95 It was something of a surprise, then, when 
                                                                                                     
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.; see also id. at 755 (“Finley and Giarratano established that there is 
no right to counsel in state collateral proceedings.”). 
 92. Id. at 757. 
 93. Id. at 755. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Freedman, supra note 84, at 1080 n.11 (referring to Coleman as 
“‘intellectually and practically’ untenable . . . [as well as] ‘morally indefensible’” 
(quoting Eric M. Freedman, Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, in 
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 553, 568 (James R. Acker et 
al. eds., 2d ed. 2003))); see also Celestine Richards McConville, Protecting the 
Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel: The Scope of 
Constitutional Obligation to Monitor Counsel Performance, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 
521, 524–25 (2005) (describing how the Court has consistently declined to 
establish a right to postconviction counsel or even extend constitutional 
ineffective assistance of counsel to statutory grants of postconviction counsel). In 
Halbert v. Michigan, the Court did hold that defendants were entitled to counsel 
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the Court chose to address, in Martinez and Maples, the 
implications in those cases of postconviction counsel’s inadequate 
performance.  
III. Martinez and Maples 
Cory Maples, an indigent Alabama death row inmate, may 
have thought he had “won the lottery.”96 Like Roger Coleman 
years before him,97 a high-powered corporate law firm had 
agreed to represent him in his postconviction proceedings.98 As 
                                                                                                     
for a discretionary postconviction appeal from a plea bargain under Michigan’s 
unique direct appeals process. 545 U.S. 605, 609 (2005). Indeed, that 6–3 
opinion, which Justice Kennedy joined, may have further contributed to the 
foundation of the Martinez ruling because it appeared grounded in a concern 
that plea-convicted defendants have at least one counseled opportunity to 
present their claims. Id. at 619; see also Steve Vladeck, Martinez v. Ryan 
Argument Preview: Direct Vs. Collateral Review and the Theory Behind the 
Right to Counsel, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 29, 2011, 12:16 PM), http://www. 
scotusblog.com/2011/09/martinez-v-ryan-argument-preview-direct-vs-collateral-
review-and-the-theory-behind-the-right-to-counsel/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(noting, in a pre-Martinez blog post, that Halbert stands for the proposition that 
“the purpose of the right to counsel is to allow defendants fully to litigate the 
merits of viable claims at least once, particularly when a pro se defendant would 
be ill-equipped to do so on his own”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 96. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 928 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“I have little doubt that the vast majority of criminal defendants would think 
that they had won the lottery if they were given the opportunity to be 
represented by attorneys from such a firm.”). 
 97. Roger Coleman was represented by the prominent D.C. law firm of 
Arnold and Porter. Lawyers at the firm misunderstood the filing deadlines for 
the notice of appeal and missed the deadline to file an appeal from the trial 
court’s denial of postconviction relief. JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY 
115 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1997) (“On December 4, 1986, Arnold & Porter filed 
Coleman’s brief on appeal with the Virginia Supreme Court. On December 9 the 
state moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal had 
been filed a day late.”). 
 98. See Adam Liptak, A Mailroom Mix-up That Could Cost a Life, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, at A10 (“Cory R. Maples, a death row inmate in Alabama, 
must have been grateful when lawyers from the firm agreed to represent him 
without charge.”); Adam Liptak, An Appeal Gone Astray Catches the Supreme 
Court’s Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011 (“Cory R. Maples, a death row inmate 
in Alabama, had what turned out to be the bad fortune to be represented by one 
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the Supreme Court would go on to observe in its opinion in his 
case, Alabama, unlike almost all other states, does not 
guarantee counsel to death row inmates seeking to challenge 
their convictions and death sentences in collateral 
proceedings.99 Instead, indigent death row inmates must 
petition non-profit organizations, law school clinics, or law 
firms to take their cases pro bono.100 Some are unable to find 
lawyers and remain without counsel as their time limits for 
filing habeas petitions wind down.101 So Maples was 
presumably fortunate to have secured postconviction counsel. 
Maples’s pro bono postconviction attorneys, however, failed 
him. After filing a state postconviction petition raising claims 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the two Sullivan & 
Cromwell attorneys, Jaasi Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz, 
left the firm without notifying either their client or the circuit 
court in which the petition was pending.102 When the circuit 
court denied relief in the case and sent the final order to the 
law firm, the order was returned to the court clerk, who did 
                                                                                                     
of the most prominent law firms in the nation.”). 
 99. See Freedman, supra note 84, at 1081 (“Notably, every active death 
penalty state today, with the exception of Alabama, provides for the prefiling 
appointment of counsel to assist with indigent death row inmates in the 
preparation of postconviction petitions challenging their convictions and 
sentences.”). 
 100. See id. at 1090 (“Alabama prisoners are at the mercy of whatever pro 
bono assistance they can scrape together and their own pro se efforts.”). Full 
disclosure: I teach in a law school clinic that represents clients on death row, 
including several in Alabama. 
 101. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 918 (2012) (“‘[A]s of April 2006, 
approximately fifteen of Alabama’s death row inmates in the final rounds of 
state appeals had no lawyer to represent them.’” (quoting AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY 
SYSTEMS: THE ALABAMA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 112 (2006))). 
 102. Id. at 916. An attorney for Mr. Munanka has disputed the accuracy of 
the facts that have been repeated in multiple media accounts and the Supreme 
Court opinion in Maples. See John Steele, Lawyer in Maples v. Thomas Case 
Asks Ethics Professors and Practitioners To Correct Their Claims, LEGAL ETHICS 
FORUM (Jan. 22, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2013/ 
01/lawyer-in-maples-v-thomas-case-asks-ethics-professors-and-practitioners-to-
correct-their-.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). However, neither Munanka nor Ingen-Housz has provided a 
public account of the facts that differs from that presented in the Court’s ruling. 
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nothing further to track down Maples’s attorneys.103 As a result, 
the forty-two days that Maples had to file a notice of appeal in the 
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals lapsed before Maples even 
learned the circuit court had denied his postconviction petition.104 
When Maples was finally alerted to what had happened (via 
a letter from the Assistant Attorney General on the case), he 
called his mother, who placed what must have been a frantic call 
to the New York firm.105 New counsel at the firm tried to rectify 
the mistake first by seeking an out-of-time appeal, which was 
denied, and then by filing a federal habeas petition raising the 
same ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims that the 
Alabama circuit court had denied.106 
The lower federal courts held that Maples’s ineffectiveness 
claims were procedurally barred because he had missed the state 
deadline for filing a notice of appeal.107 The fact that it was 
postconviction counsel who were entirely at fault did not move 
these courts, which read Coleman v. Thompson to preclude any 
excuse based on the actions of counsel to which the defendant 
was not constitutionally entitled.108 
The Supreme Court granted review “to decide whether the 
uncommon facts presented here establish cause adequate to 
excuse Maples’s procedural default.”109 Although it ultimately 
                                                                                                     
 103. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 917. 
 104. See id. at 918–20 (providing the factual and procedural history). 
 105. Jon Hayden, the assistant attorney general who wrote to Maples, 
informed Maples that he had only a few weeks to file a federal habeas corpus 
petition before his statute of limitations for doing so expired. Id. at 920. 
Although Hayden sent Maples the letter prior to the expiration of the federal 
habeas statute, he sent it after the forty-two days to file a notice of appeal in 
state court had come and gone. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 917. 
 108. See Maples v. Allen, 586 F.3d 879, 891 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Here, the 
factor that resulted in Maples’ default—namely, counsel’s failure to file a timely 
notice of appeal of the Rule 32 Order—cannot establish cause for his default 
because there is no right to post-conviction counsel.” (citing Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991))). 
 109. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. at 922. While the facts of Maples were 
egregious, they are not shocking to those familiar with postconviction practice in 
Alabama death penalty cases. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Lawyers Stumble, and 
Clients Take Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at A12 (describing the case of 
Alabama death row inmate Ronald B. Smith, whose postconviction attorney was 
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granted relief to Maples, the Court took pains to note that it was 
doing nothing to “disturb [the] general rule” of Coleman that 
“[n]egligence on the part of a prisoner’s postconviction attorney 
does not qualify as ‘cause.’”110 Instead, the facts of Maples 
represented a “markedly different situation” in which “an 
attorney abandon[ed] his client without notice.”111 Under those 
circumstances, the attorney has severed the attorney–client 
relationship, and the agency principles that typically work to 
impute the attorney’s negligence to the client are not 
applicable.112 When the prisoner has been “disarmed by 
extraordinary circumstances quite beyond his control,” he has 
demonstrated sufficient cause, the Court held, to excuse the 
procedural default.113 
  
                                                                                                     
“battling a crippling drug addiction” at the time he missed a filing deadline that 
threatened to foreclose all federal review of Smith’s constitutional claims); 
Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 1266, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting Smith’s request for equitable tolling in light of the failures of his 
postconviction counsel); id. at 1276 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“These allegations 
are sufficient to show an egregious breach of [postconviction counsel’s] 
professional ethical obligations to Smith, which, I believe, constitute the sort of 
extraordinary circumstances that merit equitable relief . . . .”).  
 110. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 122. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 922–23 (“Having severed the principal–agent relationship, an 
attorney no longer acts, or fails to act, as the client’s representative.”). Judge 
Barkett on the Eleventh Circuit has written a thorough refutation of the 
applicability, generally, of the agency analogy in the context of death row 
inmates and their attorneys. See Hutchinson v. Florida, 677 F.3d 1097, 1103–11 
(11th Cir. 2012) (Barkett, J., concurring) (explaining why “none of the key 
assumptions underlying the application of an agency relationship to a death-
sentenced client and his lawyer are valid in the post-conviction context”). 
 113. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 927. The Court remanded for a consideration of 
whether Maples had met the “prejudice” requirement to lift the bar to federal 
review of his ineffectiveness claims. See id. at 927–28 (“Having found no cause 
to excuse the failure to file a timely notice of appeal in state court, the District 
Court and the Eleventh Circuit did not reach the question of prejudice. That 
issue, therefore, remains open for decision on remand.” (citations omitted)). As a 
practical matter, this inquiry entails a review of the merits of his ineffectiveness 
claims; if they have merit, Maples should overcome the procedural bar and then 
win relief in the form of a new trial, upon federal review of his clams. 
RIGHT TO LITIGATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 863 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, dismissed the majority’s opinion as 
merely “word games” that had now established a template for 
habeas petitioners to use to get around the settled rule of 
Coleman.114 The rhetoric of Justice Scalia’s dissent was tempered 
somewhat by his recognition that the “interest of fairness,” at 
first blush, would seem to justify the result in this case, given the 
egregious facts and the State’s refusal to waive the procedural 
default.115 But, he pointed out, the precedent established in the 
postconviction context simply does not allow for an excusal of 
procedural default “whenever a defendant’s procedural default is 
caused by his attorney.”116 Maples, he contended, “invites future 
evisceration of the principle that defendants are responsible for 
the mistakes of their attorneys.”117 
In Maples, Justice Scalia was concerned that habeas 
petitioners facing procedural default would simply allege that 
their ineffective postconviction counsel were not acting as 
“genuinely representative agents” in order to position themselves 
within the Maples exception.118 Given the extreme facts in Maples 
and the narrow definition of “abandonment” the Court 
employed,119 it is doubtful that the “template” Justice Scalia 
feared will aid a significant number of habeas petitioners. In 
Martinez v. Ryan,120 however, decided two months later, the 
                                                                                                     
 114. Id. at 933 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 934. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. Of course, this principle only holds in the postconviction context. 
Defendants are not responsible for the mistakes of their attorneys in 
proceedings during which they have a constitutional right to counsel. See, e.g., 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[I]f the right to counsel 
guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left 
to the mercies of incompetent counsel . . . .”). 
 118. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 933 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 119. See id. at 917 (majority opinion) (describing the abandonment as 
“without leave of court, without informing Maples [that the attorneys] could no 
longer represent him, and without securing substitution of counsel”); see also id. 
at 923 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (likening Maples’s situation to a previous case 
involving abandoning counsel when there was a “near-total failure to 
communicate . . . or to respond to . . . inquiries and requests” (quoting Holland v. 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2568 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring))). 
 120. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
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Court created another exception to the procedural default rule, 
one that may not be as easily cabined.  
Luis Martinez was serving two consecutive life sentences in 
Arizona as a result of his convictions for sexual conduct with a 
minor following a jury trial.121 His state-appointed appellate 
attorney filed a brief on direct appeal, which was denied.122 The 
attorney did not raise any claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel because Arizona law does not allow such claims to be 
raised on direct appeal.123 The appointed appellate counsel also 
filed a petition for postconviction review in the state trial court.124 
She did not raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in 
that petition either, and the petition was eventually dismissed on 
the merits.125 
Martinez was not entitled under either state or federal law to 
new postconviction counsel, but he was able to secure new, pro 
bono counsel anyway.126 New counsel filed a second petition for 
postconviction relief, this time raising a number of claims 
alleging that his trial counsel had performed ineffectively.127 The 
Arizona courts, however, held these claims procedurally barred 
because they could have been, but were not, raised in the first 
postconviction petition.128 
                                                                                                     
 121. Id. at 1313. 
 122. Id. at 1314. 
 123. See id. (“Arizona law, however, did not permit her to argue on direct 
appeal that trial counsel was ineffective.” (citing State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525, 
527 (Ariz. 2002))). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. (“Despite initiating this proceeding, counsel made no claim trial 
counsel was ineffective and later filed a statement asserting she could find no 
colorable claims at all.”). 
 126. See id. (“About a year and a half later, Martinez, now represented by 
new counsel, filed a second notice of postconviction relief in the Arizona trial 
court.”). Martinez was able to secure new postconviction counsel when the 
Arizona Justice Project, a nonprofit organization that investigates claims of 
manifest injustice, became interested in whether Martinez was factually 
innocent or had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. E-mail from 
Professor Robert Bartels to Professor Ty Alper (Mar. 14, 2013, 10:42 PDT) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 127. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1314 (2012). 
 128. See id. (“Martinez’s petition was dismissed, in part in reliance on an 
Arizona Rule barring relief on a claim that could have been raised in a previous 
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When Martinez sought review of his ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claims in federal court, he was met with 
longstanding case law that precludes federal review of claims 
that have been procedurally barred pursuant to independent and 
adequate state rules.129 He attempted to argue that his initial 
appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness (the failure to raise trial 
counsel’s ineffectiveness in the first postconviction petition) 
constituted “cause” to excuse the procedural default.130 But there 
he ran square into Coleman v. Thompson, or at least the lower 
federal courts thought so. His claim was rejected first by the 
District Court,131 and then by the Ninth Circuit, which noted that 
Martinez had no constitutional right to postconviction counsel.132 
Thus, per Coleman, “[w]ithout a right to the appointment of 
counsel, there can be no right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.”133 
On petition for review in the Supreme Court, the case 
presented the Court an opportunity to address the constitutional 
question of whether “a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in 
collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a 
claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”134 The Court dubbed these 
                                                                                                     
collateral proceeding. Martinez, the theory went, should have asserted the 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his first notice for 
postconviction relief.”). 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 1314–15. 
 131. Martinez v. Schriro, No. CV 08-785-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 5220909, at 
*4–5 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d, 623 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom., 
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309. 
 132. See Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 743 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub 
nom., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (“We have already concluded 
that there is no right to the assistance of post-conviction counsel in connection 
with a state petition for post-conviction relief, such as Martinez asserts in this 
case.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. The actual question presented in the 
petition for certiorari was as follows:  
Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by 
state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such 
a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has a federal 
constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction 
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proceedings “initial-review collateral proceedings.”135 Whether a 
prisoner has a constitutional right to counsel in initial-review 
collateral proceedings was the question explicitly left open in 
Coleman more than two decades earlier,136 and it suggested that 
the Court might at least mandate appointment of counsel in some 
postconviction circumstances. 
The Court, however, punted on this issue: “This is not the 
case,” the Court said, to resolve the constitutional question left 
unresolved in Coleman.137 The Court did not explain why 
Martinez would not have been an appropriate vehicle for 
answering the question; instead, it simply reframed the question 
as whether ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel may 
provide cause to excuse a procedural default in federal habeas 
review, which is an equitable, as opposed to constitutional, 
determination.138 
                                                                                                     
counsel specifically with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claim. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Martinez v. Schriro, cert granted sub nom., 
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001), 2011 WL 398287. 
 135. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 
 136. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991) (“For Coleman to 
prevail, therefore, there must be an exception to the rule of Finley and 
Giarratano in those cases where state collateral review is the first place a 
prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction. We need not answer this 
question broadly . . . .”). 
 137. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). 
 138. Id. at 1315 (“The precise question here is whether ineffective assistance 
in an initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of ineffective assistance at 
trial may provide cause for a procedural default in a federal habeas 
proceeding.”). In so doing, the Court made no mention of a provision in the 
federal habeas statute that purports to rule out the adequacy of postconviction 
counsel as a ground for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2012) (“The 
ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral 
post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding 
arising under section 2254.”). To be sure, Martinez was arguing that the 
ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel should excuse the default in federal 
court, not create an independent ground for relief. See Reply Brief at 13, 
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001), 2011 WL 4500686. But Arizona had 
argued that such a result would provide “an end run around Section 2254(i).” 
See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 8, Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-
1001), 2011 WL 3947554. In any event, the Court did not address this concern in 
its opinion.  
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The Court’s 7–2 ruling in Martinez, written by Justice 
Kennedy, created an equitable exception to the rule of Coleman. It 
did so explicitly to “protect prisoners with a potentially legitimate 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”139 Specifically, the 
Court held that, when counsel performs ineffectively in initial-
review collateral proceedings or a state fails to provide 
postconviction counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings, the 
petitioner might be able to establish cause for any procedural 
default in federal court.140 If he can do so and can also demonstrate 
that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim has “some merit,” 
the default will be excused and the federal court will be permitted 
to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claims fully on the 
merits.141 
The ruling in Martinez raises a host of questions about future 
application.142 In his dissent, which was joined only by Justice 
Thomas, Justice Scalia mocked the Court both for creating an 
exception to the rule of Coleman that had, he argued, precisely the 
same effect as if the Court had overturned Coleman,143 and for 
                                                                                                     
 139. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 
 140. Id. at 1320–21  
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a 
procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a 
substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-
review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that 
proceeding was ineffective. 
 141. Id. at 1318–19. What the Court meant by “some merit” is an open 
question. See King, supra note 10, at 11 (arguing that it “remains to be seen how 
often the analysis of whether an ineffectiveness claim has ‘some merit’ or the 
analysis of whether post-conviction counsel was ineffective will force a court to 
conduct the very same merits review the default defense is supposed to 
preclude”). 
 142. See, e.g., Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines, supra note 10 
(arguing that “the equitable rationale of Martinez should apply to a number of 
claims other than ineffective assistance of counsel”); see also King, supra note 
10, at 3–5 (arguing that the question of whether a proceeding constituted an 
“initial review proceeding” was not defined by the Court, and under “Martinez 
might require a case- and even fact-specific analysis”); id. at 12 (arguing that 
“[i]t is not clear how Martinez would be applied in cases involving petitioners 
who do not want the legal representation that a state may offer for initial review 
collateral proceedings”).  
 143. Id. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Instead of [holding that there is a 
constitutional right to counsel in initial-review state habeas], the Court holds 
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suggesting that its ruling was merely a narrow advancement in 
the law.144 Where Justice Scalia decried the Court’s “word games” 
in Maples, here he was less constrained: “[T]he Court creates a 
monstrosity.”145 
IV. Toward a Right to Litigate Ineffectiveness 
A. Evolution from Rehnquist to Kennedy 
Some scholars have read Martinez and Maples as 
establishing a strong incentive for states to provide 
postconviction counsel.146 My view is that the opinions portend a 
different advancement in the law, one that, if realized, would also 
be of significant benefit to tens of thousands of prisoners serving 
noncapital sentences. With respect to the blanket provision of 
postconviction counsel, however, I am less sanguine; my reading 
is that neither case provides much incentive for states to provide 
postconviction counsel. 
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s concern that Martinez “as a practical 
matter requires States to appoint counsel in initial-review 
collateral proceedings” seems wildly exaggerated.147 Because 
                                                                                                     
that, for equitable reasons, . . . failing to provide assistance of counsel . . . 
constitutes cause for excusing procedural default. The result, of course, is 
precisely the same.”). 
 144. Id. at 1321–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s soothing assertion 
that its holding addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this case 
insults the reader’s intelligence.” (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 145. Id. at 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 146. See Shay, supra note 10, at 3 (“Maples and Martinez provide incentive 
for states to provide effective assistance of counsel in state postconviction at a 
moment when these proceedings are being forced to assume a new role in the 
development of federal constitutional procedure.”); id. at 12 (“Martinez creates 
powerful incentives for states to ensure competent counsel in state 
postconviction.”); Primus, Effective Trial Counsel, supra note 10, at 8–9 
(describing the suggestion that Justice Scalia’s predictions are overstated as 
potentially “misguided”). Eric Freedman has predicted that, in the wake of 
Martinez, “states will decide that their only reasonable choice is to provide 
effective counsel,” but he acknowledges the incentive may only exist in capital 
cases. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines, supra note 10, at 102, 104. I 
am grateful to Giovanna Shay and Eric Freedman for providing me with 
unpublished drafts of their essays. 
 147. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1327 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Martinez provides cause to avoid a default, it only “requires” 
appointment of postconviction counsel to the extent that states 
want to use procedural default to avoid merits review in federal 
court.148 Martinez comes into play only when a state prisoner files 
a federal habeas petition alleging an ineffectiveness claim that 
appears to contain “some merit.”149 For that to happen, the 
prisoner, in almost all cases, needs a lawyer in federal court. For 
noncapital defendants who typically have no habeas counsel in 
federal court, there will be no federal habeas claims to default in 
the first place. 
Martinez thus is only of use to pro se petitioners who manage 
to raise meritorious ineffectiveness claims in federal court, when 
state postconviction counsel was either ineffective or, more likely, 
not appointed at all. Most pro se prisoners are unlikely to be able 
to investigate and then present, in federal court, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel that survives the initial 
merits review Martinez prescribes; as noted above, ineffectiveness 
claims almost always require the kind of extra-record 
investigation and development that can only be accomplished by 
collateral counsel and resources for investigation.150 In short, 
states are no more encouraged to provide postconviction counsel 
                                                                                                     
 148. Id. at 1320 (majority opinion). 
 149. Id. at 1318. 
 150. Primus, Effective Trial Counsel, supra note 10, at 3 (“Because 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims are often predicated on what trial 
attorneys failed to do, they frequently require extra-record development.”). That 
is not to say that pro se prisoners will not file habeas petitions in federal court. 
They likely will, and it is possible some may be successful, especially if they 
raise purely record-based ineffectiveness claims. As Giovanna Shay and Chris 
Lasch found when researching petitions for certiorari in the Supreme Court, pro 
se petitioners in criminal cases file thousands of such petitions each year. See 
Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Inflating a New Constitutional Dialogue: 
The Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments 
of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 247 n.178 (2008). But that 
phenomenon would only affect state practice if pro se federal habeas petitions 
were likely to be successful often enough that states found themselves having to 
defend true merits inquiries. That is highly unlikely. See Uhrig, supra note 10, 
at 1222 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984)) 
In the trial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that ‘[w]hile a 
criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to 
enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of 
unarmed prisoners to gladiators.’ What I witnessed in federal habeas 
practice for non-capital, pro se litigants is precisely such a slaughter. 
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after Martinez than Congress is to provide counsel to all would-be 
federal habeas petitioners.151 
That said, there is an unmistakable cast to the Court’s 
decisions in Martinez and Maples that recognizes the value of 
postconviction proceedings, in that—unlike appellate review—
such proceedings allow for the development and presentation of 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As Justice Kagan 
noted during oral argument in Trevino, the Court’s first post-
Martinez case, Martinez “was an equitable rule about giving 
people an opportunity to raise a trial ineffectiveness claim.”152 
Much like the Court’s ruling fifty years ago in Douglas 
appreciated the value of an initial appeal as of right, these 
decisions reflect an appreciation for the value of an 
ineffectiveness claim that was absent in the Court’s Rehnquist-
era opinions. 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Maples, for example, began by 
calling out Alabama for its “low eligibility requirements for 
lawyers appointed to represent indigent capital defendants at 
trial”;153 for the lack of training it provides to, or requires of, these 
lawyers;154 and for the fact that “[a]ppointed counsel in death 
                                                                                                     
 151. Steve Vladeck has also suggested that Justice Scalia’s concerns may be 
overblown. He notes that Martinez “may in fact have the salutary effect of 
putting a greater onus on state courts seriously to consider ineffective assistance 
claims in state post-conviction proceedings,” and that, in any event, because the 
Court’s rule was merely equitable, states may choose to forgo the procedural 
default in federal court and raise a merits defense instead of choosing to provide 
post-conviction counsel. Steve Vladeck, Opinion Analysis: A New Remedy, but 
No Right, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 21, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2012/03/opinion-analysis-a-new-remedy-but-no-right/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). I differ with Vladeck as well; 
without any right to a lawyer in federal court, there is really no incentive for a 
state to provide post-conviction counsel. States will only face the Hobson’s choice 
Justice Scalia decries if an indigent prisoner manages to secure federal counsel 
or files a pro se petition that survives initial review. Those cases are going to be 
so infrequent that few states, if any, are going to conclude that the rule of 
Martinez compels the blanket provision of state postconviction counsel. 
 152. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 524 
(2012) (No. 11-10189), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_argu 
ments/argument_transcripts/11-10189.pdf. 
 153. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2012). 
 154. Id. (“Experience with capital cases is not required. Nor does the State 
provide, or require appointed counsel to gain, any capital-case-specific 
professional education or training.” (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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penalty cases are also undercompensated.”155 With respect to 
Cory Maples’s two trial attorneys, the Court noted that only one 
of them had ever served in a capital case, neither had ever tried 
the penalty phase of a capital case, and their compensation for 
work on Mr. Maples’s behalf was “capped at $1,000 for time spent 
out-of-court preparing Maples’s case, and at $40 per hour for in-
court services.”156 
Maples’s discussion of the state of indigent trial-level defense 
in capital cases in Alabama and of the representation Maples 
received at trial was irrelevant to the Court’s holding. As Justice 
Alito noted in his concurrence, “The quality of petitioner’s 
representation at trial obviously played no role in the failure to 
meet the deadline for filing his notice of appeal from the denial of 
his state postconviction petition.”157
Yet the Court included the discussion anyway.158 Was it 
simply to take the opportunity to knock Alabama for its 
insufficient system of providing counsel to indigent capital 
defendants? Perhaps. But more likely, it was included in the 
ruling because the Court recognized that the failure of 
postconviction counsel resulted in Maples’s inability to raise 
(except in his initial postconviction petition to the Alabama trial 
court) his facially legitimate claim that “his inexperienced and 
underfunded attorneys failed to develop and raise an obvious 
intoxication defense, did not object to several egregious instances 
of prosecutorial misconduct, and woefully underprepared for the 
penalty phase of the trial.”159 The claim of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel in this capital case was placed in jeopardy by 
postconviction counsel’s abandonment of their client. 
Following Maples, the Court in Martinez much more 
explicitly placed a spotlight on the value of an ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim, in a sharp departure from the 
Court’s Rehnquist-era rhetoric. The Martinez Court was 
particularly concerned not with whether prisoners had 
postconviction counsel, but with whether criminal defendants had 
                                                                                                     
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 918. 
 157. Id. at 928 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 158. Id. at 917–18 (majority opinion). 
 159. Id. at 919. 
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a fair opportunity—indeed, any opportunity—to raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel: “When an attorney errs in 
initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state 
court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim.”160 And if state 
procedural rules operate to preclude federal review of claims not 
raised in state postconviction, no court will hear a petitioner’s 
claims. Thus, the Court noted, when the ineffectiveness claim 
cannot be raised earlier, “the collateral proceeding is in many 
ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal as to the 
ineffective assistance claim.”161 The Court engaged in a somewhat 
extended discussion of the nature of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claims, noting that such claims often turn on the 
development of evidence outside of the trial record, which, as 
noted above, is all but impossible to accomplish without the 
assistance of counsel.162 
The Court then made a striking statement: “A prisoner’s 
inability to present a claim of trial error is of particular concern 
when the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel.”163 This 
assertion places ineffectiveness claims on par with, if not more 
important than, other trial errors that would typically be raised 
by appellate counsel (to which all indigent defendants are 
constitutionally entitled). The Court noted that it made sense to 
require ineffectiveness claims to be raised postconviction, as 
Arizona did, but that “[b]y deliberately choosing to move trial-
ineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-appeal process, where 
counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the State significantly 
diminishes prisoners’ ability to file such claims.”164 As noted 
above, the Court concluded by deciding that, as an equitable 
matter, a prisoner may establish cause for the default of an 
ineffectiveness claim either when counsel is not appointed in an 
initial-review collateral proceeding or when appointed counsel in 
the initial-review collateral proceeding was ineffective under 
                                                                                                     
 160. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). 
 161. Id. at 1317.  
 162. See id. (“While confined to prison, the prisoner is in no position to 
develop the evidentiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often 
turns on evidence outside the trial record.”). 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 1318. 
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Strickland standards (and either way, only when the claim has 
some merit).165 
The Court’s assertion in Martinez that a prisoner’s inability 
to present a claim of trial error is “of particular concern”166 when 
the claim is one of ineffective assistance of trial counsel echoed 
not only the “bedrock” principles enshrined in Gideon but also 
Justice Kennedy’s own concurrence in Giarratano, in which he 
described collateral proceedings as “a central part of the review 
process for prisoners sentenced to death.”167 If anything, his 
opinion in Martinez represents an extension of that view, for it 
comes in a noncapital case. 
Both Maples and Martinez, in the way they privilege the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, represent a marked 
evolution from Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in Ross, Finley, and 
Giarratano. No longer does the Court consider postconviction an 
afterthought to the criminal process. Instead, at least with 
respect to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the 
Court appears to be moving toward recognition that the right to 
raise such claims is as important as the right to raise record-
based claims typically brought by constitutionally required 
appellate counsel. My view is that this development is far more 
significant than any signals the Court sent in Martinez with 
respect to the provision of postconviction counsel generally. 
B. What the Evolution Portends 
This evolution in the jurisprudence may cautiously be 
described as the triumph of Justice Kennedy’s more expansive 
view of the role of postconviction over Justice Rehnquist’s 
                                                                                                     
 165. See id. 
Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the absence 
of an attorney) caused the procedural default in an initial-review 
collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that the 
initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or 
with ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that 
proper consideration was given to a substantial claim. 
 166. Id. at 1312. 
 167. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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parsimonious approach. To date, it has amounted only to a 
willingness on the part of the Court to provide an equitable 
remedy (excusal of procedural default), as opposed to the 
provision of constitutionally required postconviction counsel. The 
limited nature of the remedy in Martinez and Maples is 
undoubtedly a reflection, to some extent, of the lack of votes on 
the Court for an expanded right to postconviction counsel. But it 
can also be traced to an important distinction between capital 
cases and most noncapital cases: States typically do not provide 
postconviction counsel for noncapital defendants.168 They 
typically do provide postconviction counsel for capital 
defendants.169 Because of this reality, the existence, or lack, of a 
constitutional right to postconviction counsel has radically 
different implications in each context. 
Commentators and many members of the capital 
postconviction bar have long advocated for a constitutional right 
to postconviction counsel,170 but not generally because such a rule 
would provide counsel to death row inmates who would otherwise 
go uncounseled. The relevance of a constitutional right to counsel 
in the capital context is that, when appointed postconviction 
counsel performs ineffectively and contributes to the finding of a 
procedural bar, that ineffectiveness can be grounds for excusing 
the procedural default in federal court (or perhaps even an 
                                                                                                     
 168. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1322 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (referring to the “common state practice of not appointing counsel in 
all first collateral proceedings”). 
 169. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 918 (2012) (noting that Alabama 
is “nearly alone among the States” in not guaranteeing representation to 
indigent capital defendants in postconviction). 
 170. See, e.g., Alice McGill, Comment, Murray v. Giarratano: Right to 
Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 211, 212 (1990) (arguing that “the availability of postconviction 
relief is meaningless without the assistance of counsel”); Smith & Starns, supra 
note 18, at 56 (“It is the thesis of this article that the Eighth Amendment is 
violated by any state that refuses [to appoint postconviction counsel in capital 
cases].”); Alexander Rundlet, Comment, Opting for Death: State Responses to the 
AEDPA’s Opt-In Provisions and the Need for a Right to Post-Conviction Counsel, 
1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 661, 665–66 (1999) (arguing that fairness demands either a 
congressional or constitutional requirement that states provide counsel in state 
postconviction for capitally convicted defendants); Freedman, supra note 84, at 
1103 (“Intelligent lawyers, judges, and legislators should not allow Giarratano 
to divert them from doing what justice requires, and the Supreme Court should 
abandon it.”). 
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independent ground for some type of relief). Such a rule would 
have led to a different result in Coleman, as well as many post-
Coleman cases in which postconviction counsel fails to perform 
effectively. Had postconviction counsel been constitutionally 
required, the ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel would have 
excused the default in those cases and allowed the federal court 
to review the underlying constitutional claims on their merits. 
(Martinez now provides this relief to some capital clients who can 
establish the factual predicates for the Martinez exception.171) 
By contrast, a constitutional right to postconviction counsel 
in the noncapital context would mean the provision of counsel 
when none has previously existed. 
In short, a constitutional right to counsel for capital 
defendants means ensuring the competence of the lawyers they 
already have and protecting those defendants from their lawyers’ 
mistakes; for noncapital defendants, it means providing them 
with a mechanism to raise postconviction claims in the first 
instance. For capital defendants, the Maples–Martinez equitable 
remedy of default excusal provides meaningful relief in the form 
of a vehicle to allow federal court review of potentially 
meritorious federal constitutional claims. For noncapital 
defendants who have no counsel in state postconviction 
proceedings, Maples and Martinez provide no actual immediate 
benefit because the ability to excuse a default in federal court 
means little to defendants who have no lawyer to file a federal 
habeas petition.172 
The distinction between capital and noncapital defendants is 
important in terms of the legacy of Maples and Martinez because 
most capital defendants already have a mechanism for bringing 
ineffectiveness claims, even if they do not currently enjoy a right 
to have those claims brought by constitutionally effective 
counsel.173 For these defendants, Maples and Martinez provide a 
                                                                                                     
 171. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318 (establishing the circumstances in 
which a prisoner may establish cause for a default). 
 172. Again, as noted above, this is why Justice Scalia’s concern that 
Martinez effectively requires states to provide postconviction counsel is 
unfounded. Supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 173. While some state statutes require that postconviction counsel in capital 
cases be effective, the violation of these state standards does not excuse a 
procedural default in federal court, so long as Coleman generally remains good 
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vehicle to have their trial counsel ineffectiveness claims heard 
when their postconviction counsel fails them. For noncapital 
cases, the relevance of Maples and Martinez is more elusive 
because federal habeas counsel is so rarely provided.  
The irony of what may be the legacy of Maples and Martinez 
is that the Supreme Court appears more interested in a remedy 
that allows ineffectiveness claims to be raised than it does in the 
provision of postconviction counsel generally. Thus, while the 
decisions provide cold comfort today for noncapital defendants 
who are typically without federal habeas counsel to help them 
take advantage of the Court’s equitable rulings, they presage a 
postconviction landscape in which all prisoners are entitled to the 
litigation of an ineffectiveness claim in at least one forum. 
Put another way, the Supreme Court does not appear to be 
on the verge of finding a broad constitutional right to 
postconviction counsel, for anyone. But the Court seems clearly 
concerned—much more so than during the Rehnquist era—with 
convicted defendants’ ability to “get their day in court” with 
respect to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, even if 
that day in court is only one day, in one state court. In the capital 
context, in which counsel is typically provided in both state 
postconviction and federal habeas proceedings,174 the Court can 
cobble together procedural work-arounds—what Justice Scalia 
called “word games” in Maples175—to ensure that day in court 
without finding a constitutional right to counsel.  
I suggest, however, that because the defendants in Maples 
and Martinez had postconviction counsel, and in particular 
because they had attorneys to raise facially meritorious 
ineffectiveness claims in federal habeas petitions, the Court was 
able to fashion a remedy to excuse the federal court default 
without having to consider seriously a constitutional right to 
state postconviction counsel. Indeed, the fact that virtually all 
capital defendants have federal habeas counsel enables the 
                                                                                                     
law. 
 174. By statute, counsel is provided to all indigent capital defendants in 
federal habeas proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2008). 
 175. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 933 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“No precedent should 
be so easily circumvented by word games . . . .”). And it was able to do so in 
Martinez as well, when the noncapital defendant in that case happened to have 
secured pro bono state postconviction counsel. 
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equitable approach the Court took in these two cases.176 But the 
cases provide procedural protections that—when not coupled with 
a constitutional right to counsel—are of little use to noncapital 
defendants. In other words, the provision of postconviction 
counsel in capital cases has led to decisions, such as Martinez and 
Maples, that almost, but do not quite, vindicate the Court’s 
concerns regarding the ability to raise a claim that trial counsel 
was ineffective.  
Recall Justice Kennedy’s statement for the Court in 
Martinez, implying that it is as important to provide a 
mechanism to raise an ineffectiveness claim as it is to raise a 
record-based trial error claim.177 If that is the case, then the right 
to counsel to raise an ineffectiveness claim must be as grounded 
in constitutional guarantees as the right to counsel to raise a 
claim on direct appeal was in Douglas.178 That is why Martinez 
and Maples in fact portend greater protections for the rights of 
noncapital defendants to litigate claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. They implicitly envision an expansion of Douglas that 
provides not just constitutionally mandated appellate counsel but 
some form of constitutionally mandated counsel to raise 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
The Court needs to go further than it did in Martinez or 
Maples, however, in order to effectuate any meaningful ability on 
the part of noncapital defendants to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. An equitable remedy that provides an 
                                                                                                     
 176. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(2) (2012)  
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title 
28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death 
sentence, any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to 
obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other 
reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment of 
one or more attorneys . . . . 
See also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 854–55 (1994) (construing 21 U.S.C. 
§ 848(q)(4)(B) as granting “indigent capital defendants a mandatory right to 
qualified legal counsel and related services ‘[i]n any [federal] post conviction 
proceeding’” (footnote omitted)). 
 177. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012). 
 178. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (“But where the 
merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without 
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between 
rich and poor.”). 
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excuse for default is of little use to a pro se federal habeas 
petitioner attempting to raise a meritorious ineffectiveness claim. 
While a blanket constitutional right to postconviction counsel 
seems out of reach with the Court as it is currently constituted, 
there seems no other way to provide for a day in court other than 
to hold that the Sixth Amendment requires the provision of 
counsel for defendants to raise, at the least, trial level 
ineffectiveness claims in one forum.  
Admittedly, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that a 
constitutional requirement to some form of “ineffectiveness 
counsel” (or perhaps, as well, counsel to raise other, extra-record 
claims that can only be brought in initial-review collateral 
proceedings) would not impose a significant burden on the states. 
Unlike the equitable ruling in Martinez that permits states to 
gamble on the occasionally successful pro se federal habeas 
petitioner, such a constitutional ruling would require states to 
either amend their procedures to provide for meaningful 
opportunity (i.e., time, resources, and independent counsel) to 
raise trial ineffectiveness claims prior to collateral review,179 or 
they will have to fund counsel to investigate and, when 
appropriate raise, postconviction, trial ineffectiveness claims. 
Because ineffectiveness claims comprise the majority of the 
claims raised postconviction, the cost of providing counsel to raise 
ineffectiveness claims may be similar to the cost of providing 
postconviction counsel generally. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the resource 
implications of an expanded right to postconviction counsel of 
some vintage. But I will observe that if the states devoted 
appropriate resources toward improving representation at the 
trial level, the postconviction process would not be as critical as it 
                                                                                                     
 179. For the reasons explained above, supra note 19, and as the Court 
acknowledged in Martinez, it is likely impractical to force ineffectiveness claims 
into motion for new trial or appellate proceedings. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 
1318 (“Ineffective-assistance claims often depend on evidence outside the trial 
record. Direct appeals, without evidentiary hearings, may not be as effective as 
other proceedings for developing the factual basis for the claim.”). The Court has 
already made clear that it does not view direct appeal as an appropriate forum 
in which to raise most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Massaro v. 
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003) (stating that “in most cases a motion 
brought under [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding 
claims of ineffective assistance”). 
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is now to rooting out trial-level error.180 Particularly given the 
fact that the vast majority of noncapital cases result in negotiated 
settlements,181 and given that the Court has now clarified that 
defendants have a right to effective counsel at the plea-
bargaining stage,182 one could argue that, now more than ever, 
the entire system would benefit from increased devotion of 
resources at the front end.  
It may also be possible to envision some constitutional right 
to “ineffectiveness counsel” in state court to raise the 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel only when the petitioner can show 
some colorable claim to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.183 But 
                                                                                                     
 180. In the capital context, Eric Freedman has argued that  
[t]he single most meaningful reform of the capital punishment 
system, short of its abolition, would be the provision of effective trial 
counsel, through a system that provided adequate compensation, 
expert resources, and the training and support needed to practice in 
this esoteric field. If that happened—and nowhere has it to date—
there would be far fewer convictions and death sentences, but those 
few would be much more likely to stick. That is an outcome that 
would be in the best interests of all concerned. When the government 
attempts to evade costs at the front end, they emerge at the back 
end . . . .  
Eric M. Freedman, Earl Washington’s Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089, 1106–
07 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and 
Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 15 
(1990)  
[T]he provision of knowledgeable counsel at trial would restore the 
trial as the “main event” in the criminal process because 
constitutional issues would be first recognized, aired, and resolved at 
that level, rather than later. As a result, there would be fewer 
colorable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and fewer of the 
reversals and retrials that now so frequently and substantially 
prolong the process. 
 181. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven 
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are 
the result of guilty pleas.”); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) 
(“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials.”). 
 182. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (holding that “as a general rule, defense 
counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to 
accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused”); 
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (holding that a defendant who receives ineffective 
advice that results in rejection of a plea offer and conviction at trial may be 
entitled to relief). 
 183. For example, one could look to the provision of counsel in federal 
habeas proceedings. Noncapital pro se petitioners receive appointed counsel in 
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because indigent prisoners are so limited in their ability to 
research or investigate their cases, such a standard would have to 
be extremely liberal in order to have any meaning at all.184 More 
likely, the Court’s concern that defendants have their day in 
court with respect to an ineffectiveness claim could only be 
vindicated through the provision of counsel who would be tasked 
with investigating and raising, when colorable, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In any event, despite the burdens, the conclusion is 
inescapable. If, in Douglas, which, to be sure, was written by a 
very different Court in a very different era, the Court held that 
an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor 
when the former is entitled to a lawyer on appeal but the latter is 
not,185 the Court’s recognition of the importance of ineffectiveness 
claims demands the same result.  
                                                                                                     
federal habeas cases only when they can establish that an evidentiary hearing is 
required or when it is “in the interest of justice,” with a wide range of 
interpretation across courts and circuits. See, e.g., PRISON LAW OFFICE, FEDERAL 
HABEAS MANUAL § 4:25 (“There is a statutory right to appointed counsel in a 
§ 2254 proceeding under Rule 8(c) if an evidentiary hearing is required.” 
(citations omitted)). Federal courts have substantial discretion in deciding when 
to appoint counsel to noncapital habeas petitioners, and consider additional 
factors, including the complexity of the record; whether a petitioner can 
competently represent himself in a habeas proceeding; likelihood of success on 
merits; and the ability of an indigent petitioner to investigate and present his 
case. See, e.g., Schultz v. Wainwright, 701 F.2d 900, 901 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(“Counsel must be appointed for an indigent federal habeas petitioner only when 
the interests of justice or due process so require.”); Shaird v. Scully, 610 F. 
Supp. 442, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that a determination of whether counsel 
should be appointed “requires a close examination and evaluation of certain 
factors,” including the likelihood of success, complexity of the issues, and the 
ability of the indigent to investigate and present the case). 
 184. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 21, at 603 (noting that it is very difficult, if 
not impossible, for a prison inmate without counsel to gather extra-record 
evidence sufficient to establish prejudice under the ineffective assistance of 
counsel standard); Smith & Starns, supra note 18, at 88–100 (establishing the 
many ways in which indigent prisoners are ill-equipped to develop and raise 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel). Martinez itself acknowledges this. 
See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012) (“Without the help of an 
adequate attorney, a prisoner will have similar difficulties vindicating a 
substantial ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.”).  
 185. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (“But where the 
merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without 
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between 
rich and poor.”). 
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V. Conclusion 
Martinez and Maples offer hope for capital and noncapital 
defendants, but in very different ways. The equitable nature of 
the Court’s rulings means that, for capitally convicted prisoners, 
there is now some hope that, when postconviction counsel fails 
them, there may still be an opportunity to have their ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims heard in federal court. As 
several commentators have suggested, these equitable exceptions 
should be expanded to cover an even greater number of cases.186  
So long as the remedy remains equitable, however, prisoners 
without counsel to file federal habeas petitions will enjoy little 
benefit. Thus, for noncapital defendants, Maples and Martinez 
are far less helpful in the near term than they are for capital 
defendants.  
That said, the Court’s renewed emphasis on the importance 
of postconviction, because of its role in the facilitation of 
ineffectiveness claims, is a welcome evolution in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. The logic of Maples and Martinez provides hope for 
the provision of constitutionally mandated postconviction counsel, 
even if in a limited role, to enable at least one day in court on an 
ineffectiveness claim. If I am right about that, and the Court 
eventually adopts a rule that actually ensures states provide 
counsel to investigate and raise ineffectiveness claims (as 
                                                                                                     
 186. Although grounded in specific, articulated concerns about the ability of 
convicted defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, it is 
certainly true that the essential logic of Martinez would apply to other claims 
that could not have been raised until initial-review collateral proceedings, such 
as claims alleging government suppression of exculpatory evidence. See King, 
supra note 8 (wondering whether the Court will “withstand the 
inevitable pressure to expand [Martinez] to Brady, jury misconduct, and other 
late-discovered claims”); Michael O’Hear, A Good Week for the Right to Counsel, 
LIFE SENTENCES BLOG (Mar. 23, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.life 
sentencesblog.com/?p=4582 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“[T]here may be an 
argument that Martinez should apply whenever the legal or factual basis of any 
type of claim is not reasonably available during the direct review process.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). As Chris Lasch points out in a 
pre-Martinez article, there are a number of claims other than ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims that are typically “not susceptible to 
presentation before collateral review.” Lasch, supra note 20, at 45–46 (listing 
claims). Whether the courts are willing to apply the equitable principles of 
Martinez to such claims is an open question, but one that will likely be 
answered sooner rather than later. 
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opposed to merely creating tentative incentives for them to do so), 
capital defendants will benefit from the increased ability to 
establish cause for procedural default in federal court. But the 
real sea change will be with respect to the many more noncapital 
defendants who will be able to surface violations of Gideon in a 
way that has never before been possible. This aspect of Maples 
and Martinez holds the greatest promise for the vindication of 
Gideon’s “bedrock principle.”187 
                                                                                                     
 187. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317. 
